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Introduction
This paper studies the association between fair value measurements and banks' discretionary use of loan loss provisions. The ideal concept of fair value accounting is that all assets and liabilities of a firm are measured at fair value instead of historical cost and any change in the fair value of an asset or a liability is reported in the current period net income (Barth, Gomez-Biscarri, Kasznik, & Lopez-Espinosa, 2012) . Proponents of fair value accounting argue that it better reflects the value of a firm's assets and liabilities, therefore, it provides more relevant information to investors. Opponents think that fair value is not as objective or reliable as historical cost because fair value accounting requires more subjective judgments in the process of preparing accounting information, which may cause inaccuracy and uncertainty.
A recently issued standard, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 157 Fair Value Measurements (FASB, 2006) , provides practical guidance on how to consistently measure fair values within the scope of existing standards on fair value accounting. Moreover, SFAS 157 requires firms to measure fair value assets and liabilities into three levels. The subsequently issued standard, SFAS 159 Fair Value Option (FASB, 2007) , brings fair value accounting into a new stage by allowing firms to measure many other assets and liabilities at fair value. As fair value accounting evolves, the current financial reporting practice is a mix of fair value accounting and historical cost accounting. Some assets are reported at fair value with changes in fair value recognized in net income, e.g., trading assets and certain derivatives. Some assets are measured at fair value with changes in fair value reported in equity, e.g., available-for-sale assets. Some assets are measured at amortized cost, e.g., held-to-maturity assets (Barth et al., 2012) . The objective of this research is to exam how fair value information disclosed under SFAS 157 is associated with banks' discretionary accounting choices, particularly, discretionary loan loss provisions. Especially, I compare level 1 fair value measurements to level 2 and 3 fair value measurements regarding their associations with discretionary loan loss provisions. I examine the banking industry because banks hold large amounts of financial assets and liabilities, which are most affected by current fair value accounting standards.assets and liabilities based on unobservable (level 3) or indirectly observable inputs (level 2) are less value relevant (Song, Thomas, & Yi, 2010) , are associated with more information risk (Riedl & Serafeim, 2011) and information asymmetry (Liao, Kang, Morris, & Tang, 2013) , and are less priced (Goh, Li, Ng, & Yong, 2015) , compared with assets and liabilities measured by more transparent fair value inputs (level 1).
2 Thus, auditors increase audit efforts to verify such fair values, resulting in higher audit fees (Ettredge, Xu, & Yi, 2014) . In order to mitigate market discounting of the lower-level (level 2 or level 3) fair value measurements, Badia, Duro, Penalva, and Ryan (2017) provide evidence that firms with higher proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities report more conditionally conservative comprehensive income. Generally speaking, prior studies on fair value measurements imply that assets and liabilities based on lower-level fair value inputs (level 2 or level 3), inputs which do not have quoted prices directly observable from liquid and active markets, are less transparent, associated with greater valuation uncertainty and subject to more discretion. This study is motivated by the critiques and concerns on fair value accounting and explores the relation between fair value measurements described in SFAS 157 and banks' discretionary use of loan loss provisions. Researchers and practitioners believe that fair values, especially fair values based on inputs which are not directly observed or unobservable, are subject to manipulation (Benson & Teclezion, 2007; Benston, 2008) . Assets and liabilities based on level 2 or level 3 fair value inputs might be associated with banks' discretionary accounting choices, such as discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary realized security gains and losses. For example, both level 2 and level 3 assets consist of large amounts of available-for-sale securities. Banks could smooth income, manage earnings and manage capital ratios by timing the sale of these securities (Barth et al., 2012; Bratten, Causholli, & Myers, 2017; Valencia, 2011) . A large category of level 2 and level 3 available-for-sale securities are mortgage-backed securities. Level 2 and Level 3 assets and liabilities include certain derivative contracts which are not traded on active markets. Level 3 assets also consist of a large amount of loans. Both mortgage-backed securities and loans are associated with loan loss provisions which are subject to discretion. Huizinga and Laeven (2012) find that banks holding a large amount of mortgage-backed securities report significantly lower loan loss provisions to preserve regulatory capital during the financial crisis. Banks with more derivatives are more affected by SFAS 133 which reduces managerial discretion over derivatives. Thus, these banks are more likely to use discretionary loan loss provisions to smooth income (Kilic, Lobo, Ranasinghe, & Sivaramakrishnan, 2013) . On the contrary, Bratten et al. (2017) show that banks with more fair value exposure are less likely to use discretionary loan loss provisions to smooth earnings.
This study examines whether banks' discretionary loan loss provisions are associated with the proportion of a bank's assets and liabilities measured by three levels of fair value. Especially, I compare level 1 fair value measurements to level 2 and 3 fair value measurements. I focus on discretionary loan loss provisions because "the LLP is the largest and most salient accrual for banks" (Bratten et al., 2017, p. 3) and is subject to great discretion. Given the critiques and concerns on the lower-level fair value inputs, I expect that banks with larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are associated with discretionary use of loan loss provisions to smooth income, manage earnings and manage capital ratios.
Prior studies argue that managers exert discretion to reduce earnings volatility to reduce risk, increase compensation and improve access to external financing (Bratten et al., 2017) . Bratten et al. (2017) provide evidence that banks' discretionary use of loan loss provisions to smooth earnings is associated with fair value exposure. I extend their study by investigating whether banks' discretionary use of loan loss provisions are associated with fair value assets and liabilities which are less transparent and are subject to greater discretion (Level 2 and 3 fair value measurements). The literature on meeting or beating earnings benchmarks show that firms use discretionary accounting choices to avoid earnings decreases, losses or missing market expectations. So firms whose earnings just meet or beat benchmarks using discretionary accounting choices and miss earnings benchmarks otherwise can be considered as manipulating earnings (Beatty, Ke, & Petroni, 2002; Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999; Harris, Shi, & Xie, 2018) . Graham, Harvey, and Rajpopal (2005) show that about 85.1% of the surveyed CFOs in their sample consider earnings in the same quarter of the prior year to be important. Hence, I measure earnings management as small earnings increases after discretionary loan loss provisions. Prior studies also show that firms manage earnings to beat analyst forecasts (Dhaliwal, Gleason, & Mills, 2010; Davis, Soo, & Trompeter, 2009; Harris et al., 2018) . Thus, I use slightly beating the consensus analyst forecasts as an alternative proxy for earnings management. Valencia (2011) examines managers' discretionary use of Level 3 instruments to meet earnings and capital ratio targets. My study is different from his study in that I examine both level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. Valencia (2011) focuses on discretionary security gains and losses (realized and unrealized) while my study focuses on discretionary loan loss provisions.
I select a sample of U.S. public bank holding companies during the period of 2009-2016 from the Federal Reserve Bank Holding Company Database which have available fair value assets and liabilities information and other necessary financial data. I focus on public banks because the literature shows that public banks have greater incentives to manage earnings and engage in more discretionary accounting choices than private banks (Beatty et al., 2002; Beatty & Harris, 1999) . Other studies show that public banks demand higher level verifiable accounting information and exhibit greater conditional conservatism (Nichols, Wahlen, & Wieland, 2009) .
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) , I first examine the distributions of earnings changes for the banks with larger proportions of assets and liabilities based on level 2 and level 3 fair value inputs and for the banks with smaller proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. I find a discontinuity around zero in the earnings change distributions of both groups, however, the kink is significantly larger for the banks with larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. The multivariate tests show that banks with larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are associated with lower discretionary loan loss provisions. However, banks' discretionary accounting choices are not associated with the proportion of level 1 fair value assets and liabilities. Further, the estimated coefficient suggests that 1% increase in the percentage of level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities is associated with about $0.81 million decrease in discretionary loan loss provisions on average. When pre-managed earnings are lower, banks with more level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities have lower discretionary loan loss provisions to inflate earnings. The results of additional analyses show that banks with larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are more likely to use discretionary loan loss provisions to manage earnings up to beat earnings targets and inflate tier one capital ratios. Finally, I provide weak evidence that the trade-off between discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses is associated with the proportion of level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities.
My study contributes to two streams of research. I contribute to the literature examining banks' discretionary accounting choices, especially 2 SFAS157 describes a fair value hierarchy based on the inputs of fair value measurements. Level 1 fair value inputs are quoted prices directly observable from active markets for identical assets and liabilities. Level 2 fair value inputs can be directly or indirectly observable, and exclude the level 1 inputs. Level 3 fair value inputs are unobservable allowing firms to use internal models and assumptions (SFAS 157, paragraph 22-31). loan loss provisions. Beatty et al. (2002) provide evidence that public banks report more small earnings increases and less small earnings decreases than private banks by reporting lower discretionary loan loss provisions and higher discretionary security gains and losses. Beatty and Harris (1999) provide evidence that public banks are more likely to manipulate security gains to smooth earnings than private banks. I contribute to this line of research on using fair value information disclosed in the financial statements regulated by SFAS 157 to show that banks' discretionary use of loan loss provisions are associated with the proportion of assets and liabilities measured with lower-level (level 2 and level 3) fair value inputs.
I also contribute to the literature on fair value measurements. Prior studies find that fair value assets and liabilities based on lower-level inputs are less value relevant (Song et al., 2010) and are associated with a higher cost of capital (Riedl & Serafeim, 2011) , larger bid-ask spreads (Liao et al., 2013) , higher audit fees (Ettredge et al., 2014) , a larger market discount (Goh et al., 2015) and more conditional conservatism in reporting comprehensive income (Badia et al., 2017) . I contribute to this line of research by examining the association between fair value measurements, especially level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities, and banks' discretionary accounting choices. My study is different from prior studies in three main aspects. First, unlike prior studies which focus on certain types of assets or liabilities (e.g. Huizinga & Laeven, 2012; Kilic et al., 2013 ), my study focuses on level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities and directly tests the differences between level 1 and level 2&3 fair value measurements regarding their associations with discretionary accounting choices. Second, I examine a range of managerial discretion including income smoothing, earnings management, capital management and the trade-off between discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses. Third, while most of studies on fair value accounting and earnings management investigate security gains and losses (Barth et al., 2012; Valencia, 2011) , my study focuses on discretionary loan loss provisions, similar to Bratten et al. (2017) .
One implication of this paper is that investors, analysts or auditors should pay attention to banks with larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities as those banks are more likely to engage in earnings management and capital management. More important, my results show that although fair value accounting provides opportunities for transaction-based earnings management (Bratten et al., 2017) , banks might still use discretionary loan loss provisions to smooth income, manage earnings and manage capital ratios when their fair value assets and liabilities are less transparent and subject to discretion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and motivations of this study. Section 3 reviews prior research on banks' discretionary accounting choices and research on fair value accounting. Section 4 discusses the research methodology and sample selection. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. Benston (2008) points out that "fair values other than those taken from quoted prices (level 1) could be readily manipulated by opportunistic and overoptimistic managers, would be costly to make, and very difficult for auditors to verify and challenge" (Benston, 2008, p. 104 Although it is generally considered that level 3 fair value inputs are the least transparent, the most subjective and subject to the greatest discretion among the three levels, level 2 fair value measurements are also subject to managerial discretion and could be manipulated. First, companies hold a much larger amount of level 2 assets and liabilities than level 3 assets and liabilities. Taking the sample in this study as an example, level 2 fair value assets and liabilities account for about 92% of the total fair value assets and liabilities while level 3 fair value assets and liabilities account for only about 2%. This suggests that there could be more room to manage earnings through level 2 fair value measurements. Second, there are mandatory detailed disclosures for level 3 fair value assets and liabilities but there is no such disclosure requirement for level 2 assets and liabilities. SFAS 157 requires companies to reconcile the beginning and ending balances of level 3 fair value assets and liabilities and to disclose changes due to 1) total gains and losses for the period; 2) purchases, sales, issuances, and settlements; 3) transfers in and out of level 3 (SFAS157, p.12). The more detailed disclosure requirement for level 3 fair value measurements makes it more difficult to manipulate level 3 fair value measurements since they will receive more attention from investors, auditors and regulators. Ryan (2008 Ryan ( , p.1628 points out that "The required disclosures are considerably more detailed for level 3 fair value measurements" and "These disclosures make the effects of level 3 measurements on the financial statements considerably more transparent than they would have been under prior GAAP." He also mentions that "Indeed, given the poor quality market signals currently being generated, I believe level 3 fair value measurements supported by disclosures of critical inputs and the sensitivity of the measurements to the inputs often would be considerably more informative to users of financial reports than poor quality level 2 fair value measurements." (Ryan, 2008 (Ryan, , p. 1628 In addition, discussion with practitioners indicates that level 3 fair value measurements have small dollar values and managers are conservative in reporting level 3 assets and liabilities. Generally speaking, although level 3 inputs are the least transparent and the most subjective by definition, both level 2 and level 3 fair value inputs are subject to discretion so assets and liabilities based on both level 2 and level 3 fair value inputs could be associated with banks' discretionary accounting choices.
Background and motivations

Literature and hypotheses
This study follows two streams of research: (1) Discretionary accounting choices of banks; and (2) research on fair value accounting. In this section, I briefly review the two streams of research.
3 SFAS 157 defines fair value as "the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date." (SFAS 157, p.6 paragraph 5).
Discretionary accounting choices of banks
There is a rich literature on earnings manipulation practices and financial accounting choices of bank holding companies. Early studies show that banks have incentives to meet regulatory capital requirements and earnings targets, and to reduce taxes (e.g., Moyer, 1990; Scholes, Wilson, & Wolfson, 1990) . These objectives can be achieved by managing loan loss provisions and loan charge-offs, managing security gains and losses or adjusting investment strategies (e.g., Ahmed, Takeda, & Thomas, 1999; Beatty et al., 2002; Beatty, Chamberlain, & Magliolo, 1995; Beatty & Harris, 1999; Collins, Shackelford, & Wahlen, 1995) . Banks have an incentive to manipulate earnings because accounting earnings convey firm information to investors and play an important role in firm performance evaluation and accounting-based contracting (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995) . For example, Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2010) show that managers have a compensation incentive to manipulate securitization gains under SFAS 140.
Among the research on financial reporting in the banking industry, some studies specifically examine the discretionary use of loan loss provisions, which are an important accrual of bank holding companies. These studies find that loan loss provisions can be decomposed into one component which can be predicted and another component which is subject to managerial discretion. The market prices these two components differently (Beaver & Engel, 1996) . Wahlen (1994) finds a positive association between discretionary loan loss provisions and future cash flow increases after controlling for the unexpected change in nonperforming loans and unexpected loan charge-offs. Beaver and Engel (1996) also find a positive association between discretionary loan loss provisions and stock returns, supporting the signaling effect of discretionary loan loss provisions. Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, and Lobo (2009) find that auditor expertise drives the positive market reactions, suggesting that investors perceive discretionary loan loss provisions disclosed by banks to convey more valuable information when the bank is audited by specialists in the banking industry.
Banks have various incentives to manage loan loss provisions. Prior research provides evidence that banks use loan loss provisions to manage capital (Ahmed et al., 1999; Kim & Kross, 1998) and to smooth earnings (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2003) . Lobo and Yang (2001) jointly test the signaling effect, capital management effect and earnings management effect of loan loss provisions. Their findings suggest that the income smoothing effect is supported by all the models but the signaling effect is sensitive to different model specifications.
In addition to loan loss provisions, managers also have discretion over the security gains and losses. Prior studies document banks' discretionary use of security gains and losses to manage earnings (e.g., Beatty & Harris, 1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Dechow & Shakespeare, 2009) . Banks might trade off discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses (Bratten et al., 2017) . Furthermore, banks could obtain accounting benefits, such as reducing leverage ratios, via timing the sales of securities (Dechow & Shakespeare, 2009 ).
Fair value accounting
There has been a long-lived debate over fair value accounting. Early studies primarily focus on the value relevance of fair value disclosures. Barth (1994) provides evidence that the fair value of investment securities provides incremental power in explaining stock returns compared with historical book value. Barth, Landsman, and Wahlen (1995) examine fair value based earnings and regulatory capital measures under SFAS 115. They find that fair value based earnings are more volatile and banks under fair value accounting violate regulatory capital requirements more frequently. Both Nelson (1996) and Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1996) study the value relevance of fair value estimates under SFAS 107 but find conflicting results. Nelson (1996) shows that fair value measures are value irrelevant after controlling for future profitability while Barth et al. (1996) include nonperforming loans and interest-sensitive assets and liabilities as control variables and find the opposite results. Liang and Riedl (2014) examine the impact of fair value accounting on analyst forecasts. They find that U.K. firms have more accurate net asset value forecasts based on firm supplied fair values while U.S. firms have more accurate EPS forecasts based on historical cost reporting. Blankespoor, Linsmeier, Petroni, and Shakespeare (2013) show that leverage ratios using fair value information better explain banks' credit risk which is measured by bond spreads and bank failure.
The issuance of SFAS 157 Fair Value Measurements as well as the financial crisis in 2008-2009 provoked a large amount of research on fair value accounting based on the disclosure requirements and recommendations under SFAS 157. Song et al. (2010) find that level 1 and level 2 fair values are more value relevant than level 3 fair values. In addition, good governance increases the value relevance of fair values, especially level 3 fair values. Riedl and Serafeim (2011) document a higher cost of capital for financial institutions with more level 3 fair value assets. They also find that the differences in cost of capital across the three levels of fair value assets are smaller for financial institutions which have better information environments. Liao et al. (2013) document a positive association between information asymmetry, measured by the bid-ask spread, and both fair value net assets and loan loss provisions during the financial crisis. Goh et al. (2015) find that level 1 and level 2 fair value measurements are priced higher than level 3 fair value measurements during the financial crisis and the difference reduces since then. By investigating analyst forecast accuracy, Ayres, Huang, and Myring (2017) find that analyst forecast accuracy is positively associated with level 1 and level 2 fair value measurements, but not with level 3 fair value measurements.
Researchers have expressed concerns that fair value measurements described in SFAS 157 give managers more discretion over asset and liability valuation and fair values are more difficult and costly to audit (Benston, 2008) . Martin, Rich, and Wilks (2006) conclude from a stream of judgment and decision-making research that there are unintentional and intentional biases when managers prepare fair values. Specific knowledge and skills are required but difficult to gain to audit fair values. In response to these concerns, studies examine how fair value measurements in SFAS 157 affect auditing. Ettredge et al. (2014) find that fair value assets, especially level 3 assets, increase audit fees. Overall, these studies suggest that assets and liabilities based on level 3 fair value inputs are less transparent and less objective, are associated with greater valuation uncertainty and are difficult to verify.
Recent studies on fair value measurements suggest that both level 2 and level 3 fair value measurements are opaque, less reliable and subject to discretion. Bens, Cheng, and Neamtiu (2016) show that the information uncertainty associated with level 2 and level 3 fair value assets are significantly reduced after the issuance of SEC fair value comment letters. Badia et al. (2017) provide evidence that firms with higher proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities report more conditionally conservative comprehensive income. Wang and Zhang (2017) show a positive association between fair value measurements, especially level 2 and level 3 measurements, and demand for convertible debt and short-term debt. Following these studies, I differentiate level 2 and 3 fair value measurements from level 1 fair value measurements.
Level 2 and level 3 fair value measurements consist of assets and liabilities which facilitate discretionary use of loan loss provisions. For example, level 2 and level 3 fair value measurements consist of assets such as loans, mortgage-backed securities, and certain derivative contracts, etc. Prior studies imply that banks with more level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities are either more likely or less likely to use discretionary loan loss provisions. On one side, level 2 and level 3 fair value inputs are less transparent and are subject to more discretion. Banks with larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are more likely to be associated with discretionary loan loss provisions. In addition, they are more likely to be associated with income smoothing, earnings and capital management using discretionary loan loss provisions. Huizinga and Laeven (2012) find that banks holding large amounts of mortgage-backed securities report significantly lower loan loss provisions to preserve regulatory capital during the financial crisis. Kilic et al. (2013) show that firms affected more by SFAS 133 are positively associated with income smoothing using discretionary loan loss provisions because SFAS 133 reduces managerial discretion to smooth income through derivatives.
On the other side, banks subject to more level 2 and level 3 fair value exposure might be more likely to use transaction-based discretionary accounting choices. Bratten et al. (2017) show that bank holding companies with more fair value reporting rely more on discretionary security gains and losses than discretionary loan loss provisions to smooth earnings during the period of 2000-2008 because fair value accounting provides more opportunities for transaction-based earnings management. I express the testable hypotheses in this study in null forms as follows:
H1a. : Larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are not associated with discretionary loan loss provisions.
H1b. : The association between level 1 fair value measurements and discretionary loan loss provisions is not different from the association between level 2 and 3 fair value measurements and discretionary loan loss provisions.
H2. : Larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are not associated with banks' earnings smoothing using discretionary loan loss provisions.
H3a. : Larger proportions of level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities are not associated with the likelihood to beat earnings targets using discretionary loan loss provisions.
H3b. : Larger proportions of level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities are not associated with the likelihood to meet capital requirements using discretionary loan loss provisions. 
Data, sample and models
Sample selection
Discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses
I use the following models to estimate the discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses, following Beatty et al. (2002) . 
LLP
Definitions of all variables are presented in the appendix A. I expect that the loan loss provisions are increasing in bank size (Beatty et al., 2002) , change in nonperforming loans (Ahmed et al., 1999; Beatty et al., 2002; Beaver & Engel, 1996; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Lobo & Yang, 2001; Wahlen, 1994) and loan size (Beatty et al., 2002; Beaver & Engel, 1996; Wahlen, 1994) . I also expect that the realized security gains and losses are increasing in the total security gains and losses (Beatty et al., 2002; Beatty & Harris, 1999) . The residual estimated from Eq. (1) is the discretionary component of loan loss provisions. The residual estimated from Eq. (2) is the discretionary component of realized security gains and losses. The residuals are used in the main analyses.
Association between fair value measurements and banks' discretionary use of loan loss provisions
To test the association between fair value measurements and banks' discretionary loan loss provisions, I estimate the following equations similar to Bratten et al. (2017) 
Definitions of all variables are presented in the appendix A. DLLP is discretionary loan loss provisions from Eq. (1). I follow Badia et al. (2017) to define fair value measurement variables. FV1 is level 1 fair value assets plus level 1 fair value liabilities, deflated by total assets. FV23 is level 2 and 3 fair value assets plus level 2 and 3 fair value liabilities, deflated by total assets. If γ 2 is significantly different from zero, then H1a is rejected. That is, banks with larger proportions of level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities are associated with discretionary loan loss provisions. If γ 1 is significantly different from γ 2 , then H1b is rejected. The coefficient γ 3 tests earnings smoothing using DLLP. A positive value of γ 3 in the Eq. (3) and a negative value of γ 3 in the Eq. (4) imply that DLLP is larger (smaller) when the pre-managed earnings are higher (lower), which is consistent with earnings smoothing. Bratten et al. (2017) show that banks' earnings smoothing using discretionary loan loss provisions is less pronounced for banks with more fair value exposure. However, their study does not differentiate between level 1 fair value exposure and level 2 and 3 fair value exposure. To test the difference in earnings smoothing effect between banks with more level 1 fair value exposure and banks with more level 2 and 3 fair value exposure, I interact PME_HIGH (PME_LOW) with dummy variables, HFV1 and HFV23, respectively. If γ 4 is significantly different from γ 5 , then the earnings smoothing effect is different for banks with more level 1 fair value exposure from banks with more level 2 and 3 fair value exposure. To test the causality, I use a Granger-type lead-lag approach by including the lagged value of DLLP, LDLLP, as an additional independent variable, following prior studies (e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005) .
Then I test the association between fair value measurements and the likelihood to using discretionary loan loss provisions to beat prior year earnings benchmarks and analyst forecasts (H3a). Specifically, I estimate the Eq. (5) 
EM_UP is an indicator variable equal to one if change in return on assets (ΔROA) before DLLP is less than zero and change in return on assets after DLLP is slightly more than zero (0 ≤ ∆ROA ≤ 0.0012), 7 and zero otherwise. FV1, FV23 and Log(ASSET) are as previously defined. I expect θ 2 to be significantly different from zero, implying that level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities are associated with the likelihood of using discretionary loan loss provisions to manage earnings up to beat the prior year earnings targets. I replace EM_UP with EM_DN to examine whether there is an association between fair value measurements and downward earnings management using discretionary loan loss provisions. EM_DN is an indicator variable equal to one if change in return on assets before DLLP is > 0.0012 and change in return on assets after DLLP is slightly more than zero (0 ≤ ∆ROA ≤ 0.0012), and zero otherwise. Lastly, I replace EM_UP with BEAT, an indicator variable equal to one if the difference between the actual EPS from I/B/E/S and the analysts' EPS forecast is between 0 and 1 cent (slightly beat), and zero if the difference is between −1 cent and 0 (slightly miss). I expect that banks with more level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities are associated with the likelihood of beating analysts' earnings forecasts. To test H3b, I examine the association between fair value measurements and capital management by estimating the following equation:
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T1CAP_UP is an indicator variable equal to one if the actual tier one capital ratio is higher than the capital ratio before discretionary loan loss provisions, and zero otherwise. I expect μ 2 to be significantly different from zero, indicating that level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities are associated with the likelihood of capital management. Bratten et al. (2017) provide evidence that the trade-off between LLP-based and transaction-based earnings management is associated with banks' fair value exposure. To extend their findings, I examine whether this trade-off is associated with level 1 fair value exposure or level 2 and 3 fair value exposure using the following models:
Fair value measurements and the trade-off between DLLP and DRSGL
7 Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) , ΔROA is calculated as net income at year t minus net income at year t-1, divided by total assets at year t-2. The small earnings increase is defined as twice the bin width. The calculation of bin width is discussed in Section 5.1. 
DRSGL
DRSGL is discretionary security gains and losses estimated from the Eq. (2). A positive coefficient on DLLP suggests the trade-off between discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses. If the trade-off is associated with level 1 (level 2 and 3) fair value exposure, then λ 7 (λ 8 ) is expected to be significantly different from zero. I also control for bank size in models (3)-(8). In the end, all regression models are controlled for year fixed effects and all standard errors are adjusted for bank-level clustering.
Results
Earnings change distributions
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Beatty et al. (2002), I examine the distribution of changes in return on assets for my sample.
The bin width is calculated following the approach in Degeorge et al. (1999) . They suggest "a bin width positively related to the variability of the data and negatively related to the number of observations" (Degeorge et al., 1999, p. 18) . I calculate the bin width as 2M (n -1/3 ), where M is the sample interquartile range of ∆ROA and n is the sample size. The bin width in this study is 0.0006. Bin(0) indicates an earnings change ranges from 0 to 0.0006 and bin(−1) indicates an earnings change ranges from −0.0006 to 0. In the regressions, I use twice the bin width to indicate a small increase in return on assets (0 ≤ ∆ROA ≤ 0.0012). Fig. 1 plots the distributions of changes in return on assets for a subsample of banks with smaller proportions of level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities (the top panel) and a subsample of banks with larger proportions of level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities (the bottom panel). The distribution of earnings changes for the subsample with smaller proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities is smoother around bin(0) than the subsample with larger proportions of level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities. There is a discontinuity of the distribution of ∆ROA around zero for the high level 2 and 3 fair value sample, shown as unexpectedly high frequency of bank-years in bin(0) and unexpectedly low frequency of bank-years in bin(−1), but such discontinuity around zero is less apparent for the low level 2 and 3 fair value sample. I test the significance of kinks around bin(0) shown in the Fig. 1 for the two groups. I calculate the kink as the standardized difference in percentages of bank-years between bin(0) and bin(−1). 8 A larger number indicates a bigger kink. The difference in percentages of bank-years between bin(0) and bin (−1) is 3.19% for the subsample of banks with larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. This is significantly higher than the difference in percentages (1.71%) for the subsample of banks with smaller proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. In other words, the kink around bin(0) of the high level 2 and 3 fair value sample is significantly bigger than the kink for the low level 2 and 3 fair value sample at 10% level, suggesting that there is a larger proportion of bank-years reporting small earnings increases for the subsample of banks reporting larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the analyses. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The sample used to estimate discretionary accounting choices has 2565 bank-years. The average loan loss provisions are 0.8% of the average total loans and the average realized gains and losses are about 0.04% of the total bank assets. Since the sample only includes public banks, the sample banks are large. The total assets of sample banks are 43,409 million dollars on average. The mean value of change in nonperforming loans is −0.1% of average total loans and the mean of loan loss reserve is 1.7% of total loans. In terms of loan composition, real estate loans and commercial loans account for 73% and 15% of the total loans respectively.
Univariate tests
The final sample has 2500 bank-years. The mean values of discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses are zero by construction. Approximately 10.3% of the sample banks use discretionary loan loss provisions to manage earnings up to beat prior year earnings targets. Approximately 53.3% of the sample use discretionary loan loss provisions to inflate tier one capital ratios. Turning to fair value measurements, level 1 fair value assets and liabilities are about 1.4% of total assets on average. Level 2 fair value assets and liabilities account for the largest component of the total fair value assets and liabilities. Banks report very small amounts of level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. Level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities are about 19.6% and 0.5% of total assets on average. These statistics are consistent with prior studies on fair value measurements (e.g. Song et al., 2010) . Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables used in regressions. DLLP and DRSGL are positively correlated. FV1 is not correlated with either DLLP or DRSGL. FV23 is negatively correlated with DLLP and positively correlated with DRSGL. This indicates that only level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities are associated with banks' discretionary loan loss provisions. FV23 is also positively correlated with the likelihood that banks manage tier one capital ratios upward using discretionary loan loss provisions. FV23 is positively correlated with EM_UP, as expected, but the coefficient is insignificant. I turn to multivariate tests to further explore the association between fair value measurements and banks' discretionary accounting choices.
Multivariate tests
Estimation of banks' discretionary accounting choices
The estimation results of discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses are presented in Table 4 . The second column presents the estimation results of discretionary loan loss provisions. The model has an adjusted R-square of 48.7%. Loan loss provisions can be predicted by factors such as bank size, change in nonperforming loans, loan loss reserve at the beginning of the year, and different types of loans. The coefficients on ∆NPL and LLR are 0.177 and 0.519 (p < 0.001), suggesting that banks which increase nonperforming loans during the year and have a larger loan loss reserve at the beginning of the year report higher loan loss provisions. Loan loss provisions are also significantly associated with bank size and different types of loans, except for loans to depository institutions. The third column presents the estimation results of discretionary security gains and losses. The model has an adjusted R-square of 15.3%. The coefficient of total security gains and losses is positive and significant at 1% level. Overall, the estimated results of DLLP are consistent with the discretionary loan loss provisions model in Beatty et al. (2002) except for LOANR, LOANC, LOANI and LOANO. 9 The estimation results of DRSGL are consistent with discretionary security gains and losses models in prior research (e.g., Beatty et al., 2002; Beatty & Harris, 1999) . Table 5 reports the regression results of discretionary loan loss provisions on fair value measurements. In all the three models, FV23 is negatively and significantly associated with discretionary loan loss provisions controlling bank size (Log(ASSET)) and lag-year discretionary loan loss provisions (LDLLP), which rejects H1a. In the model 1, the coefficient on FV23 is −0.005, implying that 1% increase in the percentage of level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities is associated with about $0.81 million decrease in discretionary loan loss provisions on average.
The association between fair value measurements and banks' discretionary loan loss provisions
10 Because discretionary loan loss provisions negatively affect earnings, negative coefficients on FV23 imply that banks with more Note: All continuous variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1%.
(footnote continued) kink around zero is calculated as the difference in percentages of bank-years between bin(0) and bin(−1) divided by the standard deviation of the differences. 9 The estimated coefficients on LOANR, LOANC, LOANI and LOANO are inconsistent with Beatty et al. (2002) . One possible reason could be the sample period of this study is after the financial crisis, which is a time period with tightened bank lending. In addition, the sample of this study includes only public banks while the sample in Beatty et al. (2002) includes both public and private banks. 10 The average loan size over a year is $16,266 million in the sample. When the percentage of level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities increases by 1%, discretionary loan loss provisions decrease by $16,266 million × 0.005% = $0.81 million.
level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities tend to report less discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) to inflate earnings. There is no significant association between FV1 and DLLP. F-tests show that the coefficients on FV1 are significantly different from the coefficients on FV23 in all the three models, which rejects H1b.
Models 2 and 3 also test the association between fair value measurements and earnings smoothing (H2). In model 2, the coefficient on PME_HIGH is positive and significant, which is consistent with banks with higher pre-managed earnings report more DLLP to manage earnings downward. The coefficients on PME_HIGH × HFV1 and PME_HIGH × HFV23 are negative and significant only when I use one-tailed tests (p-values are 0.057 and 0.095 respectively). I do not find significantly different coefficients between PME_HIGH × HFV1 and PME_HIGH × HFV23. These results are consistent with Bratten et al. (2017) that banks with higher pre-managed earnings use DLLP to manage earnings downward.
In model 3, the coefficient on PME_LOW is negative, as predicted, but insignificant. The coefficient on PME_LOW × HFV1 is positive, as expected, but insignificant. However, the coefficient on PME_LOW × HFV23 is negative and significant at 10% level, which suggests that banks holding larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities report smaller DLLP to inflate earnings when the pre-managed earnings are lower. Further, the F-test shows that the coefficient on PME_LOW × HFV1 is significantly different from that on PME_LOW × HFV23. These results provide evidence beyond Bratten et al. (2017) that only banks with lower pre-managed earnings and larger level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are associated with upward earnings management using DLLP. Overall, Table 5 shows that banks with larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are negatively associated with DLLP. Further, banks with lower pre-managed earnings are associated with more DLLP to inflate earnings only when banks hold larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. These results reject H1 and H2. Table 6 presents the association between fair value measurements and the likelihood of beating prior year earnings targets and analyst forecasts. EM_UP captures bank-years which have earnings decreases before DLLP and report small earnings increases after DLLP. In other words, EM_UP measures the probability that banks use DLLP to beat prior year earnings targets and otherwise would miss prior year earnings targets. The results show that FV23 is positively and significantly associated with EM_UP, suggesting that banks with more level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are more likely to manage earnings upward to beat prior year earnings targets. EM_DN measures the probability that banks manage earnings downward using DLLP. FV23 is negatively and significantly associated with downward earnings management using DLLP, which confirms the results in Table 5 that banks with larger proportions of fair value assets and liabilities are associated with less downward earnings management using DLLP. In the last column, BEAT identifies bank-years which beat analysts' earnings forecasts. The coefficient on FV23 is positive and significant at 1% level, suggesting that banks with larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are associated with the likelihood of beating analyst earnings forecasts. In both column 1 and column 3, the F-tests show the coefficients on FV1 and FV23 are significantly different, implying the effect of level 2 and level 3 fair values on earnings management to beat earnings targets is different from the effect of level 1 fair values. Table 7 presents the association between fair value measurements and capital management using DLLP. T1CAP_UP measures the probability that banks inflate tier one capital ratios using discretionary loan loss provisions. I find that FV23 is positively and significantly associated with T1CAP_UP, implying that banks with more level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are more likely to manage tier one capital ratios up using discretionary loan loss provisions. However, FV1 is insignificantly associated with T1CAP_UP. F-test shows that FV1 and FV23 are significantly different regarding their associations with the likelihood of capital management using DLLP. Taken together, the results in Table 6 and Table 7 reject H3.  Table 8 presents the results of the trade-off between discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) and discretionary realized gains and losses (DRSGL), as well as the association between the trade-off and fair value measurements. The coefficients on FV23 are positive and significant while the coefficients on FV1 are not, suggesting that only level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are positively associated with Table 8 provides weak evidence that the association between the trade-off between DLLP and DRSGL and fair value exposure might be driven by level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. In additional analyses, I repeat the regressions in Table 5 using a restricted sample consisting of banks which have information throughout the whole sample period. There are 189 banks which have information during all years from 2010 to 2016. The un-tabulated results show that controlling for bank size and lag-year DLLP, FV23 is negatively associated with DLLP and the coefficient is significant at 1% level in all the three models. FV1 is insignificantly associated with DLLP. PME_HIGH is significantly positive (p < 0.01) and PME_LOW is significantly negative (p < 0.01), which is consistent with earnings smoothing using DLLP. F-tests show that the association between DLLP and FV1 is significantly different from the association between DLLP and FV23 (p-value < 0.05). The association between DLLP and upward earnings management is significantly different (p-value = 0.097) between banks with more level 1 fair value exposure and banks with more level 2 and level 3 fair value exposure. Taken together, results using the restricted sample are consistent with the results using the full sample.
Conclusions
This study examines the association between fair value measurements and banks' discretionary loan loss provisions using regulatory financial data from 2009 to 2016 for a sample of U.S. public bank holding companies. I find that banks recognizing larger proportions of assets and liabilities measured by level 2 and level 3 fair values are associated with lower discretionary loan loss provisions. However, there is no significant association between level 1 fair value assets and liabilities and discretionary loan loss provisions. When pre-managed earnings are lower, banks with more level 2 and 3 fair value assets and liabilities are associated with lower discretionary loan loss provisions. Further analyses show that banks reporting larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are more likely to use discretionary accounting loan loss provisions to meet prior year earnings targets, beat analyst forecasts and preserve tier one capital ratios. Overall, the results are consistent with fair value assets and liabilities based on level 2 and level 3 inputs are less transparent and are subject to more discretion.
Data availability
Data are available from public sources identified in the study.
Appendix A. Definition of Variables
Dependent variables
DLLP: discretionary loan loss provisions estimated from eq. (1). DRSGL: discretionary realized security gains and losses estimated from eq. (2).
EM_UP: an indicator variable equal to 1 if change in return on assets before DLLP is less than zero and change in return on assets after DLLP is slightly more than zero ([0, 0.0012]), and 0 otherwise.
EM_DN: an indicator variable equal to 1 if change in return on assets before DLLP is > 0.0012 and change in return on assets after DLLP is slightly more than zero ([0, 0.0012]), and 0 otherwise.
T1CAP_UP: an indicator variable equal to 1 if the actual tier one capital ratio is higher than the tier one capital ratio before DLLP, and 0 otherwise.
BEAT: an indicator variable equal to one if the difference between the actual EPS from I/B/E/S and the consensus analysts' EPS forecast is between 0 and 1 cent (slightly beat), and zero if the difference is between −1 cent and 0 (slightly miss).
Fair value variables and other independent variables FV1: the sum of level 1 fair value assets and level 1 fair value liabilities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year. FV2: the sum of level 2 fair value assets and level 2 fair value liabilities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year. FV3: the sum of level 3 fair value assets and level 3 fair value liabilities divided by the total assets at the beginning of the year. RSGL: realized security gains and losses divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.
TSGL: total reported unrealized securities gains, computed as the sum of recognized securities gains plus the ending fair market value of securities less their cost, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.
